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Interspatial and intertemporal grain distribution in Ghana is a private sector 
activity carried out mainly by traders. These traders sometimes collude to maximize their 
joint profits. By so doing they influence the conduct of the grains market. To examine the 
effect of their actions on the informal maize market in Ghana, a spatial equilibrium model 
was estimated under three scenarios: (1) Perfect competition, (2) Cournot-Narsh 
conjectures, and (3) Collusion. The results indicate that imperfect competition distorts 
grain flows, reduces consumer welfare and depresses traders’ sales revenue.  Collusive 
behavior of traders, on the other hand, causes the greatest distortion of grain flows as well 
as trader and consumer welfare. These results draw attention to policy makers and 
development agents to educate traders against using their associations to foster collusion. 
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Introduction 
Grain marketing in Ghana takes place in the formal and informal market places. 
At the rural level farmers sell their produce to local assemblers. These assemblers intend 
sell to wholesalers directly or through commission agents at a fee. Wholesale traders hold 
large stocks of grains in the urban centers for extended periods of time before releasing 
them to retailers who eventually sell directly to consumers. It has been observed that 
urban wholesalers who also retail directly or indirectly through agents constitute over 
90% of retailers (Langyintuo, 1997). Some wholesalers also assemble grains in the rural 
areas. 
Unlike the assemblers and commission agents who act individually, wholesale 
traders in some urban centers organize themselves into associations around commodity 
groups (eg, yam and cassava sellers association, grain sellers association, etc) under the 
leadership of so called “market queens” with an objective to agitate for favorable market 
conditions. The associations sometimes influence the conduct of the market by 
controlling the quantity of grains released from storage on to the market on any given 
day. For instance, if the association members anticipate large volumes of grains coming 
from non-members they deliberately cut back on the quantity of grains they release from 
their storage. The maize market can therefore be characterized as imperfectly 
competitive. Where traders are successful in forming an association, they have the power 
to collude to maximize their joint profits. Where no such association is effective, the 
traders may make strategic moves to maximize their individual profits. 
Using a spatial price equilibrium model incorporating conjectural variations, this 
paper attempts to analyze the impact of the actions of market traders on maize flows, consumer welfare and maize traders’ revenues in a Ghanaian market context. The 
relevance of the paper is that it operationalizes spatial equilibrium models in a developing 
country context where marketing is largely influenced by the informal sector. The paper, 
therefore, hopes to add to the growing literature on spatial equilibrium models.  
 
Spatial Equilibrium Models 
Spatial equilibrium models were developed by Enke (1951) and Samuelson 
(1952) and then refined by Takayama and Judge (1971). They originally assumed that 
markets are either perfectly competitive or monopolistic. For instance Takayama and 
Judge (1971), McCarl and Spreen (1980) and Norton and Schiefer (1980) discussed 
perfect competition and monopoly in spatial market situations. Florian and Los (1982) 
created a more general formulation of the static single commodity Samuelson, 
Takayama-Judge model, using a wide class of non-linear programming algorithms. These 
formulations incorporate transportation networks, such as terminals, ports, and truck 
routes, and can also be extended to incorporate multiple commodities with non-linear 
transportation costs (Weinberg, 1985; Batterham and MaCaulay, 1994; Dennis, 1999). 
Nelson and McCarl (1984) presented methodological modifications to the 
traditional imperfectly competitive markets for application in spatial equilibrium models. 
Subsequently various scientists (Hashimoto, 1985; Weskamp, 1985; Salant, 1986; 
Capozza and Van Order, 1989; Anderson and Neven, 1990; Sheppard et al, 1992) 
explored the benefits of incorporating imperfect competition in spatial models. 
Spatial equilibrium models are also regularly used to investigate international 
trade of agricultural commodities. As indicated by Tomek and Robinson (1990), spatial 
price equilibrium models provide a convenient framework that can be used to determine the indirect as well as the direct effects of changes in production in one or more regions 
on the volume and direction of trade. In addition, such an analytical model may be used 
to ascertain the price effects of relaxing or increasing trade barriers between countries or 
regions. Mwanaumo et al (1997) analysed recent and proposed maize marketing reforms 
in Zambia. A continuous-space model is used to capture the effects of changing transport 
systems in place of the traditional point-representation model. This method permits the 
authors to use pre-reform data on supply, demand, and transport costs to infer both intra- 
and interregional effects of liberalization and shows that the welfare gains from 
liberalization are larger than commonly thought. Langyintuo et al (2005) used a spatial 
and temporal price equilibrium model formulated as a four-period mixed complementary 
programming to examine the implications of reduction in non-tariff barriers and interest 
rates on capital on cowpea trade between the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and Central African Economic and Monetary Cooperation (CAEMC). 
They showed that with a reduction in real interest rates within ECOWAS, the larger of 
the two monetary unions, consumers in the relatively larger coastal economies and 
producers in the smaller Sahelian economies would benefit while all others lose although 
net social welfare would increase. Removing NTBs among countries in the larger trading 
bloc may alter the pattern of cowpea flows with total trade volume increasing but inter-
bloc trade would decrease. Kawaguchi et al (1997) examined imperfectly competitive 
spatial equilibrium model for milk market in Japan. They introduced conjectural variation 
in the standard spatial model to account for various degrees of market imperfection.  
 Model Formulation 
This paper adapts the model by Kawaguchi et al (1997), which introduces 
conjectural variation in the standard spatial model to account for various degrees of 
market imperfection. The model is estimated under the assumptions of perfect 
competition, Cournot-Narsh equilibrium and collusion. The perfect competition scenario 
considers the situation where traders have no market power to influence price. The 
situation where traders have conjectures regarding their fellow traders when they take an 
action such as when no active traders’ association is captured in the Cournot-Narsh 
conjectures scenario.  Under the collusion scenario, it is assumed that there is an active 
and effective traders association through which traders can effectively collude to 
maximize their joint profits.  Other underlying assumptions of the model are that maize 
traded is homogeneous, market demand functions are linear and traders have equal and 
constant per unit costs. All maize consumers are price takers. 
Let’s consider n maize producing and m consuming regions where there is one 
grain market in region j. Let the unit transportation charge from producing region i to 
consuming region j be Tij and assumed to be same for all traders. Traders ship the grain to 
the various regions with the objective of maximizing their sales revenue less costs of 
procurement and transportation. Before proceeding with the analysis we need to define 
the following terms: 
Mj = Excess demand of maize demanded in region j,j = 1, 2, … m 
M j  =  j - jPj = Demand function of maize, and Pj the demand price, 
Xi = Excess supply of maize from region i, i = 1, 2, … n. 
Xi = vi + Pi = Marginal cost function of producers, 
Pi = Producer price in region i, mri = Marginal revenue net of transportation costs for each market, 
Xij = Quantity of maize shipped from region i to consuming region j, 
Tij = Unit transportation cost of shipping from region i to consuming region j, and 
Rj = Total maize sales revenue net of transportation costs in consuming region j. 








ij ij ij j j X T X P R Max
11
       …   ( 1 )  







           …   ( 2 )  
Trader i’s maize sales revenue in market j, (PjXij), can be written as: 
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Where k  i indicates all traders other than i. By introducing imperfect competition as 
adopted by Kawaguchi et al (1997), when trader i believes that a change in her maize 
supply will cause changes in all other traders’ maize supply to market i, trader i’s 
“perceived” marginal maize in market j is 
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Where  ij is trader i’s conjectural variation regarding changes in all other traders’ maize 
supply to market j caused by a change in trader i’s supply. Using the above relationship, the total revenue maximization problem for all m traders can be re-specified as below, net 
social pay-off maximization adjusted for imperfectly competitive markets. 
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When the market is perfectly competitive  ij = -1 and the  ij ij ij j dX X    ) 1 )( ( 1    term 
drops out. But when Cournot-Narsh behavior is assumed,  ij = 0 meaning that Trader i 
believes that other traders will not change their supply in response to the trader’s action. 
In the case of a collusion,  ij = 1. 
Using the Lagrange function (L) with the multipliers  and  for constraints (5) 
and (6), respectively, the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for the maximization 
problem can be expressed as follows: 
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The Lagrange multipliers  and  measure maize demand price and the marginal 
revenue net of transportation cost for each market. The above Kuhn-Turker conditions 
indicate that each trader must equalize marginal revenue net of transportation costs across 
all markets where it sells maize. The  ij ij j X ) 1 )( / 1 (     in equation (8) indicates the 
difference between maize demand price and trader i’s marginal revenue in market j. To 
complete the model we introduce producers’ supply functions for maize. Producers 
operate under perfect competition conditions and are therefore price takers. Subject to 
prevailing producer prices, producers in region i choose a level of output at which 
marginal cost equal to price. 
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To solve the model, a mathematical programming model using General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) was employed in an iterative mode. First, the equilibrium 
demand quantities and prices according to equations (3) and (11) are estimated based on 
initial values of Xi and given patterns of behavior of the traders. The second iteration 
involves the estimation of producer price based on equation (12). In the third iteration, 
new values of Xi for the next iteration are computed based on the calculated producer 
price and marginal cost function of producing regions under the assumption that 
producers are price takers in equation (13). This procedure is repeated until values for Xi 
become stationery. Data and empirical results 
The regional maize supplies as well as producer and consumer prices between 
2006 and 2008  (Table 1) were obtained from the Policy Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation Division of the Ghana Ministry of Food and Agriculture (PPMED, 2008). 
Prices in from 2006 and June 2007 were denominated
2.  The per capita consumption of 
maize and regional population data from GSS (2008) were used to estimate regional 
maize demands. Together with supply, excess supply and demand by region were 
established as in Figure 1. Eastern, Ashanti, Northern and Brong-Ahafo Regions are net 
exporters while Central, Western, Greater Accra, Upper East and Upper West Regions 
are net importers of maize. (Volta region was not included in the analysis for data 
inadequacy.) Supply and demand elasticities were extracted from the Ghana Living 
Standard Survey reports for 2008 and assumed to be the same for all locations. Distances 
between producing and consuming centers ranged from 120 km for Eastern region – 
Greater Accra region route and 864 km for the Northern region – Western region route. 
Average transportation charge was estimated at GH¢0.01 per ton of maize per kilometer 
in 2008 nominal prices. 
The estimated results indicate that under the perfect competition scenario, the 
optimal quantity of maize shipped out to consuming regions is 356,558.577 mt (Table 2). 
Northern region supplies Upper East, and Upper West regions. All the supply from 
Ashanti gets shipped to Greater Accra and all the demand for Central region is satisfied 
by maize from Eastern region. Eastern, Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions service greater 
Accra with the highest average price for maize. 
                                                           
2 In July 2007 the Ghana government re-denominated its currency by setting ten thousand cedis (¢) to one 
Ghana Cedi (GH¢). Exchange rate as at the end of May, 2010 was: 1US$ = GH¢1.45 
 The introduction of imperfect competition results in differences in maize 
allocation to consuming regions. Under the Cournot Nash equilibrium, maize is shipped 
to all consuming regions but the total quantity shipped is about 8% less than in the case 
of perfect competition (Tables 3). Greater Accra and Upper East regions suffer the most 
reduction in supplies. The introduction of monopoly power further restricts grain 
shipment to the various locations. Table 4 indicates that monopoly conditions lead to up 
to 16%, about twice the proportion reduction in grains supplied compared with perfect 
competition. Under monopoly, the reduction of up to 21% in the supply to Accra is 
substantially higher than for the Upper East with up to 17% reduction. The Upper West is 
the least affected. 
Reduction in sales quantities reflects in relatively higher demand prices at 
equilibrium. The highest demand price for maize was observed in Accra. Under imperfect 
competition, consumers in Upper East region experience 21% increase in price, higher 
than any other location. Under monopoly situation, price increase is much more 
significant in the Greater Accra region with 31% over the perfect competition situation 
than observed in any other location. The Upper West region experienced the least 
increase in price just as the case for quantity restriction.  
Despite the increase in prices, reduction in quantity has resulted in reduction in 
total revenue accrued to the traders contrary to their objective. This is in line with 
economic principle given that maize a is price inelastic commodity. The total sales 
revenue of ¢16.2 million under perfect competition is reduced by 10% under imperfect 
competition and by 17% under monopoly. 
 Conclusion 
The introduction of imperfect competition in spatial markets greatly affects maize 
flow. Trade quantities are restrict with imperfection with the greatest restriction in the 
case of monopoly. These restrictions resulted in increased prices. However, total sales 
revenues are decreased as a result of the quantity restriction. Therefore, imperfect 
conditions for a price inelastic commodity such as maize do not increase the general 
welfare of traders contrary to their expectations. At the same time, they reduce demand 
given the relatively high prices and thus decrease consumers’ welfare. Therefore 
imperfect competition in the maize market in Ghana distorts trade flows and leads to a 
general welfare loss for both consumers and traders. This study draws attention to the fact 
that collusive behaviors are unlikely to result in increased profits when the commodity is 
price inelastic. The need for policy makers and development agents to educate traders 
against using their associations to foster collusion is imperative for the general welfare of 
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Quantity (mt)  Price (¢/mt)
1 Quantity  (mt) Price  (¢/mt)
 1 
Northern 82,650  35.33  -  - 0.42 
Ashanti 28,000  49.38 -  -  0.42 
Brong Ahafo  90,860  40.41  -  -  0.42 
Eastern 57,290  42.45 -  -  0.42 
Upper East  -  -  42,700  41.88  -0.5 
Upper West  -  -  28,480  38.75  -0.5 
Greater Accra  -  -  80,460  52.99  -0.5 
Western - -  44,100  52.51  -0.5 
Central -  -  54,200  47.26  -0.5 
Total/average 258,800  41.90  249,940  46.65  -0.5 
Sources: PPMED, MoFA, 2008 
Note:  
1 Exchange rate at end May, 2010: 1 US$ = GH¢1.45 
2 Elasticities assumed similar for all regions in same category 
  Table 2: Spatial perfect competition equilibrium quantities of maize shipped to 
consuming regions from supply regions (ton) 
 Consuming  region  Total 
Upper East Upper West Greater Accra Western Central 
Northern 43,690  27,479 -  14,429 -  85,598
Ashanti -  -  26,273 -  -  26,273
Brong-Ahafo -  -  2,646 32,752 55,877  91,275
Eastern -  -  57,733 -  -  57,733
Total 43,690  27,479 86,653 47,180 55,877  260,879
Note: - No value Table 3: Spatial imperfect competition equilibrium quantities of maize shipped to 
consuming regions from supply regions (ton) 
 Consuming  region  Total
Upper East Upper West Greater Accra Western Central 
Northern 15,745  10,724 23,567 13,253 15,511  78,800
Ashanti 3,503  2,412 7,226 4,712 5,268  23,122
Brong-Ahafo 13,334  9,008 25,695 15,745 17,953 81,735
Eastern 6,464  3,867 17,177 10,711 12,036  50,253
Total 39,046  26,011 73,664 44,421 50,768  233,910
% of PC  -12  -6 -18 -6 -10  -12
 Table 4: Spatial monopoly equilibrium quantities of maize shipped to consuming regions 
from supply regions (ton) 
 Consuming  region  Total 
Upper East Upper West Greater Accra Western Central 
Northern 13,590  9,435 21,211 13,208 14,876  72,318
Ashanti 3,425  2,481 6,185 4,238 4,647  20,976
Brong-Ahafo 12,590  8,847 22,337 14,626 16,248  74,648
Eastern 6,872  4,625 14,369 9,494 10,468  45,829
Total 36,477  25,388 64,102 41,566 46,239  213,772
% over PC  -20  -8 -35 -14 -21  -22
% over IPC  -7  -2 -15 -7 -10  -9
 Table 6: Equilibrium prices under different market conditions (GH¢/ton) 
 Consuming  region 
Upper East  Upper West Greater Accra Western  Central 
Perfect competition  40.00 41.62 45.69 45.88  44.46
Imperfect competition  50.08 46.46 63.22 51.75  53.86
% of PC  125 112 138 113  121
Monopoly 57.38 48.76 83.48 59.11  64.93
% of PC  143 117 183 129  146
 Figure 1: Maize supply as a percentage of demand by region in Ghana, 2006-08 
Key:   ER  =   Eastern Region 
 CR  =  Central  Region 
 WR  =  Western  Region 
  GAR  =  Greater Accra Region 
 ASR  =  Ashanti  Region 
 UWR  =  Upper  West  Region 
 UER  =  Upper  East  Region 
 NR  =  Northern  Region 
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